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1 Introduction
There are many situations in which individuals’ decisions to behave proso-
cially and cooperatively (or the contrary), can be observed in the future by
other individuals, with no direct connection to them, but who may neverthe-
less be influenced by them. The widespread use of social media contributes
to this visibility: a recent survey of 2000 US internet users aged 6-17 found
that 34% of respondents chose “YouTube stars” when asked to select “the
five people I look up to the most”.1 While only a small minority of individu-
als will become, sometimes to their surprise, social media “stars”, many can
achieve significant visibility, and potentially influence others.
Does knowing that they may be viewed as role models by other, notably
younger, people affect the way individuals behave? Does it make them more
likely, on average, to behave prosocially? This is a challenging question to
answer with existing available data, as it is difficult to distinguish any role
model effect from other influences on behavior. In this paper, we exploit the
control afforded by a laboratory experiment. We study how participants’
behavior in an experimental public good game is affected when they know
that information about their choices and outcomes, together with some in-
formation about their identity, will be transmitted the following year to a
set of new, unknown, younger participants - with no payoff linkages between
the two sets of players.
The basic game in our experiment is a ten-period repeated voluntary
contribution game (VCG) with partner matching. We explore two questions:
first, does knowing that they will be acting as potential role models for future
younger players have a significant impact on individuals’ choices? Second,
how does behavior vary with the degree of future visibility of identity?
We run two sets of experimental sessions. Subjects are recruited exclu-
sively among graduate students for the first set of sessions, and exclusively
among first-year undergraduates in the following academic year at the same
university for the second set. Thus when information is transmitted, it is
always from graduate student participants now to new undergraduates next
year in the same university. We will refer to them as “first generation” and
“second generation”, respectively, for expositional convenience. We chose
this feature of the design to make it as easy as possible for participants in
the first set of sessions, the graduate students, to think of themselves as po-
tential role models for participants in the second set of sessions, i.e., first-year
undergraduates arriving the following year. The instructions for our treat-
1See https://www.mintel.com/press-centre/social-and-lifestyle/us-kids-say-social-
media-stars-are-more-influential-than-athletes-actors-and-the-president.
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ment sessions make the notion of acting as role models very salient, telling
graduate participants that we will let first-year undergraduates playing the
same VCG the following year “benefit from your ‘knowledge’ and ‘experi-
ence’”. The reference to knowledge and experience deliberately allows for
different possible interpretations in our setting: being knowledgeable and ex-
perienced can be viewed as consistent with playing the no-contribution Nash
equilibrium strategy in every period, but equally with building strategic rep-
utation through positive contributions in early periods, leading potentially
to Pareto-superior outcomes.2
The first set of sessions, with graduate students, is the focus of the present
paper, since we are interested in the behavior of potential role models under
different rules about information transmission3. It consists of three types
of session. In the control sessions, subjects, randomly and anonymously
assigned to groups of four, play a standard voluntary contribution game over
ten periods. There is no information transmission. In the treatment sessions,
there is transmission: subjects know that the history of play in their session
(each player’s contribution in each period), will be transmitted to first-year
undergraduate participants in a future session. In addition, each subject
is told that he/she will be individually matched to a subject in the future
session, who will receive more personal information: his/her personal history
in the game will be highlighted, and transmitted together with some personal
characteristics (age, gender, nationality and academic status, i.e., Master or
Ph.D student).
We have two treatments: the “information” treatment, exactly as just
described, and the “photo” treatment, where transmission additionally in-
cludes a photo of the subject (graduate student). The photo is the only
difference between the two treatments. This basic design enables us to study
the two questions mentioned above. In particular:
(i) comparing behavior in the treatment groups with behavior in the
control group allows us to investigate whether there is a significant effect as-
sociated with subjects’ awareness of acting as potential role models, which is
held constant in the two treatments while absent from the control condition4;
2Thus Andreoni and Croson [2008] remark: “with plenty of experience in a number of
finitely repeated games, subjects will learn the benefits of reputation building”.
3We provide some summary information about the second set of sessions in section 2,
but analysis of data from these sessions is not the focus of the present paper.
4Specifically, our strategy aims at obtaining an upper bound on any such effect, by
explicitly telling subjects that they will be acting as role models, and that their personal
history of play, as well as characteristics, will be highlighted in the information transmitted.
To the extent that this represents “experimenter demand”, it does so by design (as in, for
example, De Quidt et al. [2018]).
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(ii) comparing behavior in the photo treatment with the information
treatment makes it possible to explore the role of visibility of identity by
future undergraduates.5
Our original conjecture was that increasing visibility would lead to higher
contributions. This conjecture was motivated by the existing empirical lit-
erature on visibility and audience effects, which has generated considerable
evidence of a positive effect: subjects tend to behave more prosocially and
generously when their behavior can be observed by others than when it is
private and anonymous6.
Our experiment yielded two main findings. First, the average contribution
rate in the information treatment was the same as in the control group: our
experimental instructions encouraging graduate students to think of them-
selves as potential role models for future first-year undergraduates, and em-
phasizing their knowledge and experience, do not appear to have elicited
higher (or lower) average contributions. The second and surprising result,
contradicting our original conjecture, was that subjects in our photo treat-
ment, far from contributing more, contributed substantially less than in the
two other conditions. Our analysis shows that the photo treatment affected
contribution decisions through two channels: lower initial contributions (in
the first period), and different dynamic behavior over subsequent periods.
Moreover, we allowed for a surprise restart game in our design, to test for
learning effects7. We found that contributions in the photo treatment con-
tinued to be significantly lower during the restart game.
Our key finding then is that individuals appear to behave less proso-
cially and achieve lower levels of cooperation when they are aware that their
behavior and identity will be visible to future, unknown and younger indi-
viduals facing similar circumstances. Why? We carefully examine the evi-
dence for and against several possible explanations. We investigate whether
subjects in the photo treatment were more likely to play Nash equilibrium
zero-contribution strategies, or something very close to them: this conjecture
is not supported by the data. We also find no evidence of a negative effect
5Visibility of identity by the experimenters is held constant for all three experimental
conditions.
6See, for example, Alpizar et al. [2008], Andreoni and Bernheim [2009], Andreoni and
Petrie [2004], Ariely et al. [2009], Bohnet and Frey [1999], Dana et al. [2006], Fox and Guyer
[1978], Harbaugh [1998], List et al. [2004], Hoffman et al. [1996], Rege and Telle [2004],
Soetevent [2005] . An exception is Dufwenberg and Muren [2006]: in their dictator game,
dictators are less generous when their identity and decisions are observed by an audience
of fellow students. However, several potential confounds are present in the study, partly
because the design is intended to investigate gender effects and as a consequence the gender
of the recipient is made salient to participants.
7Following Andreoni [1988].
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of the degree of exposure to the teaching of economics on contribution rates
in the photo treatment.
Given this, we consider three possible explanations for our findings. The
first is that subjects in the photo treatment expect other participants to be
less cooperative and adjust their own contributions accordingly. The second
is that subjects in the photo treatment pay more attention to the game, and
are less likely to make mistakes. The third is that subjects are reluctant to
risk being perceived as “suckers” by future first-year undergraduates. The
combined evidence from the original game (including elicited initial beliefs)
plus the restart game, appears more consistent with this last explanation. In
the concluding section, we discuss this result and its implications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We complete this
section by discussing the relationship between our work and the existing
literature. We then describe our experimental design in section 2. We present
our first results in section 3, focusing on the first round (the VCG played
over ten periods): here we show how average contributions evolved over
time, and examine treatment effects for initial contributions and for total
contributions over the game. Understanding the dynamics of contribution
decisions over the ten periods requires a dynamic econometric model: we
discuss our modeling approach in section 4, and present the results in section
5. We go on to study the surprise restart game in section 6. Finally, we
discuss possible explanations for our results, and their implications, in section
7; we then offer some concluding remarks.
1.1 Literature Review
Role models play a part in theoretical analyses of cultural transmission: in
Bisin and Verdier [2000], children who are not successfully “socialized” by
their parents will acquire the traits of a role model instead (through im-
itation and learning). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
investigate role models experimentally. Our work is also clearly related to
the theoretical literature on image concerns, in which individuals care about
the inferences that others will make based on their observable behavior: for
example, inferences about how prosocial and disinterested they are (Be´nabou
and Tirole [2006]), or the extent to which they care about fairness (Andreoni
and Bernheim [2009]).
Our result on contributions in the photo treatment is related to previous
experiments that have varied the visibility of subjects’ identity and contribu-
tion decisions in public good games. Andreoni and Petrie [2004] use photos,
as we do, but for a different purpose: subjects in their photo treatment
are identified to other members of their group (their co-players). The other
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treatment variable is information: subjects in their information treatment
learn the contributions of each co-player. When identification and informa-
tion are used together (information-and-photos treatment), contributions are
substantially higher than in the control group. Rege and Telle [2004] also
vary the visibility of subjects’ choices and identity: in their “approval” treat-
ment, each participant has to stand up in front of the others and write his
contribution on a blackboard. This treatment increases contributions sig-
nificantly. Our photo treatment differs from both these designs in a very
important respect: we make identity visible not to current participants, who
are co-players in the game, but to future, unknown and younger participants,
with no payoff linkages.
More broadly, our paper is related to other work on the impact of iden-
tification and audience effects (see, e.g., footnote 6). Charness et al. [2007]
explore the impact of a partisan audience on play in two experimental games,
the Battle of the Sexes and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In their Face-to-Face
experiments, participants are randomly assigned to the Row group or the
Column group, who sit in separate rooms. Each subject plays with a mem-
ber of the other group. To investigate audience effects, there is a treatment
in which each subject plays once as a “Host”, in front of other members
of his own group, and once as a “Guest”, in front of members of the other
group. The presence of a partisan audience leads “Hosts” to behave more
aggressively in both games. Our design investigates instead the impact of a
non-partisan, future audience.
Since we have two “generations” (graduates and undergraduates), there
is a link with the experimental literature on intergenerational games. In this
literature each group of subjects represents a generation, and is replaced by
another group (generation) when they finish playing8. A key feature of these
games is the transmission of advice from each generation to the succeeding
one, and the presence of monetary linkages between them, implying that
each generation has a monetary stake in the behavior and outcome of the
generation that will receive the advice. We differ from this literature in both
respects (no advice and no monetary linkages), as well as in other ways, since
we focus on quite different research questions.
Also somewhat related to the notion of role models is the literature on
leader-follower public good games. These are sequential voluntary contribu-
tions games in which one subject in the group makes the first contribution
decision (the leader), while the other subjects (the followers) make their
8The intergenerational approach was pioneered by Schotter and Sopher [2003, 2007],
and developed in the context of public good games by Chaudhuri et al. [2006].
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decisions after observing the leader’s choice9. However, these games differ
significantly from ours in several important respects, including the fact that
the other players in the group are the audience, and the leader’s payoff will
depend directly on their choices as well as his own.
Finally, our transmission treatments can be thought of as making sub-
jects’ group identity - as graduate students and potential role models - partic-
ularly salient. Our results therefore contribute to the experimental literature
on group identity10. Eckel and Grossman [2005] investigate the impact of
varying induced group identity on behavior in repeated public good games.
They find that simply assigning subjects to identifiable teams does not affect
cooperation, but increasing team identification by having team members first
cooperate on an unrelated task does increase cooperation. In a similar vein,
we find that simply making group identity salient through our instructions
to subjects (information treatment) does not have a significant impact on
behavior. Combining this with visibility and identification by future players,
on the other hand, does change behavior significantly.
2 Experimental design
2.1 Procedures
Participants in the first generation were graduate (Master or PhD) students
in Economics and related disciplines at Bocconi University in Milan and at
the University of Toulouse.11 We chose such a specific population to ensure
they would be credible as potential role models for first-year undergraduates
playing the same experimental public good game the following year. None
of the graduate student participants were being supervised by the experi-
menters, or attending any of their courses. They voluntarily showed up at
experimental sessions after replying to E-mail or poster invitations. Exper-
imental sessions in Milan were conducted in a computerized classroom of
Bocconi University and subjects were seated at spaced intervals. Sessions in
Toulouse were conducted at the Laboratory of Experimental Economics of
the Toulouse School of Economics. The experiment was programmed and
implemented using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher [2007]).
9See, for example, Arbak and Villeval [2013], Ga¨chter et al. [2012], Gu¨th et al. [2007],
Levati et al. [2007], Potters et al. [2007], Rivas and Sutter [2011].
10See, among others, Charness and Sutter [2012], Chen and Li [2009], Chen and Chen
[2011], Klor and Shayo [2010], Kranton and Sanders [2017], Kranton et al. [2018].
11In Toulouse, 67% of subjects were enrolled in an economics graduate programme and
in Milan 45%. Other fields of study were mostly business administration, management,
finance, and statistics.
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We had 9 sessions (6 in Milan and 3 in Toulouse) with 16 subjects per
session, hence 144 subjects in total. Each person could only participate in
one of these sessions. Thus, we ended up having 2/3 (96/144) of the subjects
participating in Milan and the remaining 1/3 (48/144) in Toulouse. Further-
more, 59% (85/144) were Master students and the remaining 41% (59/144)
PhD students, with a good balance between the two locations. Average
earnings were e37.50, including a e5 show-up fee; the average duration of a
session was 65 minutes, including instructions and payment.
Participants in the second generation were first-year undergraduate stu-
dents in Economics and related disciplines. We had 12 sessions with 16
subjects per session hence 192 subjects in total. Each person could only
participate in one of these sessions. All the sessions were conducted in Milan
(Bocconi University) a year after the corresponding first-generation sessions.
Note that, although our initial intention was to match every first-generation
participant to some second-generation participant in the same university,
both logistic and financial constraints led us to eventually implement this
matching only partially (only a subset of first-generation participants were
actually matched to second-generation subjects). Given the constraints, we
focused on one location, Milan. Average earnings were e19.25 including a
e5 show-up fee. The average duration of a session was 40 minutes including
instructions and payment. Since our focus is on potential role models’ behav-
ior, we will not further describe nor analyze the second generation behavior
in the paper.12 In what follows, we will restrict our attention to the first
generation behavior.
2.2 Design
Treatments The experiment consisted of a voluntary contribution game
(same for all conditions) and of three conditions (between-subject design),
depending on whether subjects were told that behavior in the experiment
and some of their personal characteristics would be transmitted, and whether
transmitted identity features included a subject’s photo. We had the same
number of subjects (48) in each of the three conditions, with 32 subjects (2
sessions) and 16 subjects (1 session) participating in the experiment in Milan
and in Toulouse, respectively.
12Unlike first-generation subjects, second-generation subjects were not told that any of
their information would be transmitted to any subsequent generation. In other words,
they were not in a position to act as role models.
8
Initial questionnaire A questionnaire about personal characteristics was
submitted before the instructions. Each subject was asked his/her gender,
age, nationality, year and field of study.
2.2.1 Voluntary contribution game
Stage game The stage game was the standard voluntary contribution
game (VCG) of Andreoni [1988] and follow-up papers: Each subject, ran-
domly and anonymously assigned to a group of n subjects, was given an
initial endowment of 100 euro-cents (e 1), and asked to allocate them be-
tween a public and a private account. The set of possible contributions to
the public account included all integer numbers between 0 and 100. The
marginal per capita return of a contribution to the public account was set
to k/n with k < n. The subject’s payoff was the sum of the per capita
return of the group contribution to the public account and the amount of
euro-cents left in the private account (initial endowment minus individual
contribution). In our parametrization of the game, each group was made
of n = 4 subjects, and the marginal per capita return was set at k = 2.
Therefore, each euro-cent in the group account was doubled and then shared
equally among the four subjects in the group. In other words, each individ-
ual in a group received half of the amount of the group contribution to the
public account.
Repeated game: first round The stage game was initially repeated for
10 periods, under a partner matching design. Hence, once randomly formed,
group composition remained the same during all the 10 periods. At the end
of each period, subjects in a group were informed about the four ranked in-
dividual contributions and payoffs (for an example of how the information
appeared on the subject’s screen, see Figure 6 in the Appendix).13 Before
the first period of the repeated game, each subject was asked to guess the av-
erage contribution of his/her three co-players in period 1 (in integer numbers
between 0 and 100 euro-cents).
13Notice that, due to ranked individual contributions, such feedback did not in general
enable participants to obtain information about individual behavior across periods of an-
other subject in the group. Indeed, if e.g. subject 1 contributed to the public account 100
euro-cents in period 1 and 0 euro-cents in period 2, with each of the other three subjects
in the group contributing 10 in both periods, feedback was (100,10,10,10) after period 1
and (10,10,10,0) after period 2 on each computer screen. This did not allow any subject
other than subject 1 to know that the highest contribution in period 1 and the lowest
contribution in period 2 were made by the same subject (herself/himself).
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Repeated game: second round As in Andreoni [1988] and follow-up
papers, at the end of the 10 periods of VCG, participants were exposed to a
surprise: they were offered the opportunity to play again the same 10-period
repeated VCG under the same rules and parametrization of the first round,
with partner matching, and within the same group as in the first round. This
was a surprise restart game: participants did not know until the first round
had ended that a second round would follow. Therefore, participants were
offered the choice of ending the experiment and being paid only for the first
round, or continuing the experiment and be paid also for the second round.
Once the surprise was introduced, as in the seminal study by Andreoni [1988],
we were explicit in pointing out that after the second round the experiment
would be over, in order to make subjects aware that there would not be other
surprises. All participants chose to continue the experiment with the restart
game.
2.2.2 Treatment Manipulations
Section 2.2.1 described the control treatment. We had two treatment ma-
nipulations, “information” and “photo”. Note that in all three conditions,
subjects knew that their identity, choices and outcomes would be observed
by the experimenters,14 but their identity would never be revealed to their
co-players, and could not be inferred by them.
The two treatment conditions differed from the control condition in the
following way. At the end of the instructions, each subject was told that both
his answers to the initial questionnaire (age, gender, nationality and academic
level) and the history of his choices and outcomes in the VCG (contributions,
earnings, and ranking within the group) would be transmitted to the first-
year undergraduate student who, a year later, would be sitting in the same
place,15 playing the same VCG with other first-year undergraduates, under
the same group matching.16 In particular, in both conditions, subjects were
14Our study is comparative (behavior in the photo treatment is analyzed in contrast to
behavior in the information treatment, which in turn is analyzed in contrast to behavior in
the control treatment). Hence, the absence of anonimity toward the experimenter, which
is quite common in repeated VCG like ours and held constant for all three conditions,
should not affect our main comparative results.
15The time delay (one year) and the specification of “first-year” for undergraduates
participating in the subsequent session were meant to make graduate students aware that
subjects to whom their information would be transmitted would belong to a cohort of
undergraduate students not yet enrolled at the university at the moment when the exper-
iment was run.
16The subject was told that the same three computers that would be randomly assigned
to his computer so as to form a group during his session would be assigned to the computer
of the undergraduate student sitting in his place the following year.
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told that we would transmit the information contained in the history table
they would see at the bottom of their screen at the end of each period. Figure
6 in the Appendix shows an example: this specific history table would have
been seen at the end of period 10, with partial versions being seen at the end
of each previous period.
The photo and information conditions differed from each other in only
one respect: in the photo treatment, each subject was also told that, in addi-
tion, his photo would be transmitted. The photo was taken during the initial
questionnaire, with the subject seated in front of the computer screen, and
the randomly assigned computer number easily visible. To ensure that par-
ticipation was entirely voluntary in both treatments, we always gave subjects
the option to leave the experiment at the end of all instructions; i.e. after
learning what would be transmitted and how. In this case, the subject would
be paid the show-up fee, and he would be replaced by another graduate stu-
dent in the experiment (one who, offered the same option to leave, chose to
stay).17 In the information treatment, only 1 out of 48 subjects opted to leave
and was replaced. In the photo treatment, 2 out of 48 participants opted to
leave (in two separate experimental sessions), and were similarly replaced.
Then, all actual participants filled in a release document for their photo. This
document stated that their photo would be displayed on the same computer
screen during all the experimental session attended by the randomly chosen
undergraduate student a year later, and then destroyed at the end of that
experimental session and no longer used. Then, the experiment started.
In summary, our experiment consists of three distinct conditions as de-
scribed above: control, information, and photo. Observability by the experi-
menters is held constant for all three conditions. There is no transmission in
the control condition, and hence no possibility for the graduate student par-
ticipants to act as role models for future undergraduates. In both treatment
conditions, there is transmission, and graduate participants are told that we
will let future first-year undergraduates benefit from their knowledge and
experience.18 The only difference between the two treatments is the infor-
mation that will be transmitted to future undergraduates: in one condition
a photo is included, in the other it is not.
17In each treatment session, we recruited 18 potential participants, although only the
first 16 were allowed to participate in the experiment. The last two recruited participants
listened to the experimental instructions, and were paid the show-up fee when none of the
other 16 participants opted to leave the experimental session.
18The precise wording is exactly the same in both treatments; see the Appendix.
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2.2.3 Payment
At the end of the experiment subjects were paid in cash the sum of their
payoffs in each period of the repeated VCG. They were also paid (e 5) if their
guess of the co-players’ average contribution in the first period was correct
(i.e., if the difference between the guess and the actual average contribution
was less than or equal to 10 euro-cents).
All of the above held for both the first and the second round of the 10-
period VCG, although subjects discovered that there was a second round
(and that they would be paid for it) only at the end of the first one.
In treatments “information” and “photo”, there was no extra payment
for the transmission of information and history to the subsequent undergrad-
uate session. Subjects were told that their earnings and the undergraduate
students’ earnings would be independent.
2.2.4 Instructions
The instructions used in the experiment are available in the Appendix.
3 Contribution patterns and differences be-
tween treatments
We start by examining contribution patterns and differences between treat-
ments. In this section, we focus on the main game, i.e. the public good
voluntary contribution game played over ten periods, described in detail in
section 2. We will discuss the results for the subsequent (surprise) restart
game later (in section 6).
Figure 1 shows average (mean) contributions in each period for the control
group, and for each of the two treatments with transmission.
Average contributions in the control group start at 56%; they peak at
63%, falling to their lowest level, 28%, in the last period. This is broadly
consistent with patterns observed previously in the experimental literature
on public good games.19 For the information treatment, average contribu-
tions start marginally higher (58%); they peak at 65%, falling to their lowest
level of 25% in the last period. Finally, average contributions in the photo
treatment start at a much lower level (45%), and remain substantially lower
19See Ledyard [1995]. Contribution rates are somewhat lower in Andreoni [1988], An-
dreoni and Petrie [2004]; a little higher in Chaudhuri et al. [2006]; quite similar in Croson
[1996].
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Figure 1: Average contribution across periods in first round
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until the end, reaching the lowest level (19%) in the last period. As a con-
sequence, average contributions for the game (pooling observations over the
ten periods) are equal to 54% for the control group and the information
treatment, but only 39% for the photo treatment.
The difference between the photo treatment and the other conditions is
statistically, as well as economically, significant. The Kruskal-Wallis rank test
rejects the equality of populations hypothesis at the 1% level (p = 0.0067).
Pairwise comparisons between the photo treatment and each of the other
groups using Dunn [1964]’s (1964) test with a Bonferroni adjustment for
multiple comparisons reveal a highly significant difference in both cases (p =
0.0088 when comparing photo and control, p = 0.0097 when comparing photo
and information)20. There is no significant difference between the control
group and the information treatment. If we pool all observations of choices
at every period and estimate a standard regression with individual contribu-
tion as the dependent variable, or a Tobit regression (to take into account the
fact that the data is censored at 0 and 100), we find again that contributions
are significantly lower in the photo treatment, controlling for participants’
age, gender, education level (Master or PhD), location (Milan or Toulouse)
and nationality (local or foreign), as well as a time trend (period) to allow
for a decline in contributions as the end of the game approaches. The re-
sults are reported in Table 1. They show that participants’ characteristics
cannot explain the lower contributions in the photo treatment. In what fol-
lows, we investigate further the differences between treatments and possible
explanations for our results.
Are subjects in the photo treatment more inclined to play the
Nash equilibrium strategy?
To investigate this conjecture, Figure 2 presents histograms showing the
distribution of contributions for the three experimental conditions, pooling
observations for all ten periods of the game.
We see immediately from Figure 2 that the significantly lower average
contributions in the photo treatment are not explained by subjects’ greater
propensity to behave in line with game-theoretic equilibrium predictions,
leading to a much higher proportion of very low contributions in this treat-
ment. Indeed, if we focus on zero contributions (the equilibrium prediction),
the proportions are as follows: control group 21%; information treatment
19%; photo treatment 16%. On the other hand, there is a striking difference
between the photo treatment and the other two groups when it comes to
large contributions: these account for a much smaller proportion of contri-
20In both cases N = 96; we follow Andreoni and Petrie [2004] in taking as the unit of
observation the average contribution per subject over the 10 periods.
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Regression Tobit regression
Period -2.5739∗∗∗ -4.6890∗∗∗
(0.3300) (0.5684)
Location 3.0103 7.0686∗
(2.3924) (4.1153)
Gender -6.3949∗∗∗ -10.8698∗∗∗
(2.0289) (3.4535)
Education -0.5854 -2.7659
(2.0984) (3.5761)
Age -0.7078∗∗ -0.8307
(0.3055) (0.5199)
Nationality -0.0095 0.2240
(2.1877) (3.7504)
Information -1.7516 -3.4702
(2.4970) (4.2932)
Photo -16.2494∗∗∗ -23.5220∗∗∗
(2.4922) (4.2620)
Constant 89.6799∗∗∗ 109.8855∗∗∗
(8.4383) (14.3668)
Log likelihood -5135.6661
R2 0.0847
χ2 123.0048∗∗∗
F 16.5510∗∗∗
N 1440 1440
N uncensored 828
N lower uncensored 269
N upper uncensored 343
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1: Regression results for contributions in first round (observations are
pooled over all ten periods)
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Figure 2: Distribution of contributions across conditions in first round (ob-
servations are pooled over all ten periods)
bution decisions in the photo treatment. The difference is mostly reflected in
a higher proportion of moderate contributions (over 10% but not exceeding
40%) in the photo treatment.
Are contribution rates in the photo treatment higher for groups
of non-specialists (in economics)?
We can complement the previous findings by checking whether the lower
contributions in the photo treatment appear to be driven by the extent to
which subjects have been exposed to Economics teaching. Specifically, is it
the case that contributions are higher in groups where no participants are
specialising in the study of economics, relative to those where at least some
participants are indeed specialising in the study of economics? For exposi-
tional convenience, we will refer to students enrolled in an Economics Master
or PhD programme as “specialists”, while those enrolled in a Master or PhD
programme in another subject, or a combination of subjects (e.g. Master
in Law, Economics and Management, or Master in Finance and Information
Technology) will be described as “non-specialists”.
We can identify 12 subjects in the photo treatment who are non-specialists
and played the game in groups consisting exclusively of non-specialists; i.e
groups where the effect of economics teaching might be expected to be
weaker. Their average contribution rate over the ten periods of the game
was 35%. For the remaining 36 subjects in the photo treatment, the aver-
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age contribution rate was 41%. Obviously the sample size is too small to
say anything general about differences between specialist and non-specialist
groups. We can note, however, that in our sample the contribution rate is in
fact lower for the non-specialist groups. Thus we find no evidence that the
low contributions in the photo treatment can be explained by the degree of
exposure to economics teaching.
In order to better understand the reasons for our results so far, we need to
investigate decisions in the first period, when subjects have not yet observed
the behavior of other members in their group, and then study dynamic be-
havior over subsequent periods, when subjects can observe and respond to
their co-players’ choices. We begin by focusing on initial decisions.
Contributions in the first period
In the first period, average contributions are equal to 56% in the control
group, 58% in the information treatment, and 45% in the photo treatment.
Table 2 presents Tobit regression results for the initial contribution.
The first column in Table 2 shows that initial contributions are signifi-
cantly lower in the photo treatment, controlling for age, gender, nationality,
education level and location.
Why do photo treatment participants contribute significantly less in the
first period? One possibility could be that the photo treatment affects sub-
jects’ initial beliefs, making them more pessimistic about their co-players’
contributions and hence reducing their own contributions. We can investi-
gate this possibility thanks to a feature of our experimental design described
in detail in section 2: we elicited our subjects’ beliefs about their co-players’
average contribution just before the start of the game. The second column
in Table 2 differs from the first by including this variable, denoted by BE-
LIEFS. As expected, more optimistic beliefs about the average contribution
by other players in the group increase own contributions. However, there is
still a significant negative effect of the photo treatment on initial contribu-
tions, which is not explained by initial beliefs. Indeed, when we then checked
whether initial beliefs depend on treatment, we did not find any significant
effect of treatment on beliefs.
To shed more light on why initial contributions are lower in the photo
treatment, we can repeat the earlier analysis of heterogeneity that we applied
to pooled contributions for the entire game. Once again, the aim is to check
whether the lower average contribution is due to a higher proportion of very
low contributions. Figure 3 presents histograms showing the distribution of
initial contributions for the three experimental conditions.
Clearly, the pattern of heterogeneity is similar to the one observed ear-
lier: the lower average initial contributions in the photo treatment are not
explained by a higher proportion of very low contributions. Indeed, for zero
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Init Init bel
Location -6.2230 -9.9954∗
(9.5171) (5.3069)
Gender -7.8502 -4.0318
(8.0584) (4.4568)
Education 21.8135∗∗ 10.6982∗∗
(8.4283) (4.7352)
Age -2.0713∗ -1.0495
(1.2333) (0.6960)
Nationality 10.0639 11.8943∗∗
(8.7188) (4.8677)
Information -6.8511 -10.2293∗
(10.0090) (5.7351)
Photo -21.7250∗∗ -15.3608∗∗∗
(9.9782) (5.6490)
BELIEFS 1.3566∗∗∗
(0.0949)
Constant 114.8566∗∗∗ 21.3330
(33.2470) (19.5481)
Log likelihood -569.7983 -491.3946
χ2 12.4331∗ 169.2406∗∗∗
N 144 144
N uncensored 101 140
N lower uncensored 8 0
N upper uncensored 35 4
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2: Regression results for initial contributions in first round
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Figure 3: Distribution of initial contributions across conditions in first round
contributions, the proportions are 8.33% (control), 6.25% (information), and
2.08% (photo); while for contributions not exceeding 20% they are 22.92%
(control), 12.5% (information), and 20.83% (photo).
We have established one channel through which treatment affects average
contributions: the photo treatment has a significant negative effect on initial
contributions. This does not appear to be explained by more pessimistic ini-
tial beliefs, nor by a greater propensity to behave in line with game-theoretic
equilibrium predictions. In the next section, we turn to subjects’ dynamic
behavior. Does treatment affect the way participants respond to the choices
made by other members of their group? To explore this question we need
to study the dynamics of contribution decisions. We go on to do this in
the following sections, starting with a discussion of the methodological issues
involved.
4 Dynamics: methodology and econometric
issues
The aim of the econometric analysis developed below is to identify the de-
terminants of participant contributions in the panel data setup generated by
our experiment, since we have repeated observations on a cross section of
participants as they progress through the trials.
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The basic relations to be investigated can be described as
contributionit = f (contributionit−1, avcontributionit−1, controlsit)
where contributionit is the contribution of individual i at time t, avcontributionit
is the average contribution of the rest of individual i’s group at t and controlsit
a vector of other determinants (location, age, gender, etc.).
As an empirical approximation to this relation we can write the following
linear stochastic equation:
contribution∗it = λcontributionit−1 + γDIFFit−1 + β
′
zit + δtimet + uit
with uit = αi + εit
where contribution∗it is a latent variable reflecting the desired contribution of
individual i at time t, contributionit−1 the actual contribution of individual
i at time t−1, the term DIFFit−1 = contributionit−1−avcontributionit−1 is
the difference between own lagged contribution and the average contribution
of the other three members of individual i’s group at time t − 1, zit a set
of individual specific conditioning variables (that may or may not be time
varying) and timet some form of time trend (we experiment with various
formulations to capture the possibility that contributions decline as t ap-
proaches the end of the experiment). The error uit is a random disturbance
term reflecting any omitted variables or other sources of randomness. We
assume uit comprises two components, an individual specific random effect
αi and an idiosyncratic error term εit that is assumed independent of the z’s
and α’s. Notice that it is the lagged outcome that is included, not the lagged
latent variable. This is appropriate in our setup where the truncation occurs
due to corner solutions and not as a result of top and bottom coding the
data.
The coefficient λ captures a degree of persistence in an individual’s contri-
bution whilst the coefficient γ captures the effect of an individual’s contribu-
tion differing from the average contribution of the remainder of his/her group
in the previous period. We shall also allow for an asymmetry in this effect
by including an extra term of DIFFit−1 interacted with a dummy capturing
when DIFFit−1 is positive (we call this variable POSDIFFit−1). This allows
the impact of DIFFit−1 to be different depending on whether it is positive
(so in period t− 1 individual i contributed more than the average of his/her
co-players) or negative (in period t− 1 individual i contributed less than the
other group members’ average).
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The observational rule is then:
contributionit = 0 if contribution
∗
it < 0
contributionit = 100 if contribution
∗
it > 100
contributionit = contribution
∗
it otherwise
A number of econometric issues arise with this specification, particularly
when we include the individual effect, i.e., uit = αi + εit. Firstly there
is an essential non-linearity in that the observed outcome contributionit is
truncated at 0 and 100 (and in our experiment there is a significant degree of
censoring at these boundaries) so that a maximum likelihood tobit estimator
is appropriate.
Secondly relative to a standard random effects panel with exogenous re-
gressors the presence of the lagged dependent variable contributionit−1 (both
on its own and as a component of DIFF ) is problematical. The lagged de-
pendent variable interacts with the individual effects to generate biases in
the estimated parameters (see Nickell [1981], Hsiao [1986]). This bias can
be severe particularly if the time dimension of the panel is small. In a lin-
ear framework there are well known methods to eliminate this bias by first
differencing the data to eliminate the individual effects and then using an
IV or GMM approach to deal with the induced endogeneity in the resulting
transformed model (Anderson and Hsiao [1982], Arellano and Bond [1991]).
In a non-linear model this approach will not work. In general for non-linear
panel models there need not be a transformation that can eliminate the indi-
vidual effects and produce a viable set of moment conditions for estimation.
This problem has attracted a great deal of attention and some progress has
been made in the context of certain specific non-linear models in deriving
exact inferential procedures. An alternative that we follow here is due to
Wooldridge [2005]. Here the idea is to specify auxiliary (conditional) distri-
butional assumptions for the individual heterogeneity. The disadvantage of
this approach is that misspecification arises if this assumption is violated.
The advantage is that this can give rise to a relatively straightforward max-
imum likelihood estimation.
To implement Wooldridge’s suggestion we here specify the individual ef-
fects as:
αi = α0 + α1contributioni1 + α
′
2z¯i + ζi
where z¯i contains the time averages of the exogenous variables (avcontributionit−1, zit)
in the sample and ζi is a normally distributed error term independent of these
variables and the εit. Estimation then proceeds by substituting the fixed ef-
fects in the regression with these additional variables, and estimating the
resulting model by maximum likelihood tobit procedure.
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5 The dynamics of contributions: results
This section presents the main results from our econometric analysis of the
dynamics of contributions over the ten periods of the first round. The second
round (surprise restart game) will be analyzed in the following section.
5.1 Pooled data
To begin with, we pool observations for the three experimental conditions.
Table 3 shows results for the symmetric and asymmetric model, where the
dependent variable is the contribution by player i at time t. Recall that
the symmetric model assumes responses of equal magnitude when a subject
observes a difference, positive or negative, between his/her last contribution
and the last average contribution by his/her co-players; while the asymmetric
model allows for different magnitudes of response, and in particular for the
possibility that individuals respond more (less) when they see that they have
contributed above (below) the average. The first two columns in the table are
based on our preferred specification, the dynamic tobit using Wooldridge’s
method, as discussed in detail in the previous section. We find a large and
significant effect for own lagged contribution (LCONTRIBUTE) and for
the difference between own lagged contribution and the average of the three
co-players’ lagged contributions (DIFF ).21 Thus individuals tend to make
a similar contribution to the one they made in the previous period, but
adjust this in the light of their co-players’ behavior in that period: if the
other players in the group contributed more on average, they revise their
own contribution upwards, while if the others contributed less, they revise
their own contribution downwards.
Comparing the symmetric model (column 1) and the asymmetric model
(column 2), we see that the latter seems more appropriate for our data: the
coefficient on the asymmetric effect (represented by the variable POSDIFF )
is highly significant. Thus when they realize they have been contributing
more than the average, individuals decrease their contribution more than
they increase it after discovering that they contributed less than the average.
We also include, for comparison, the results from random effects tobit
regressions (although subject to bias as discussed in the previous section),
for the symmetric model in column 3 and for the asymmetric model in column
4. They are consistent with the main findings discussed above: once again,
21Note that the total effect of the lagged dependent variable is captured partly by
the coefficient of LCONTRIBUTE but also partly by the coefficients of the variables
measuring the difference between own lagged contribution and average lagged contribution
by the other members of the group.
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Dynamic (Wooldridge) Tobit RE Tobit
Symmetric Asymmetric Symmetric Asymmetric
LCONTRIBUTE 1.3162∗∗∗ 1.2741∗∗∗ 1.3462∗∗∗ 1.3218∗∗∗
(0.0874) (0.0874) (0.0682) (0.0684)
DIFF -0.6995∗∗∗ -0.4163∗∗∗ -0.6646∗∗∗ -0.4414∗∗∗
(0.0796) (0.1046) (0.0672) (0.0946)
POSDIFF -0.5120∗∗∗ -0.4126∗∗∗
(0.1265) (0.1265)
Period -3.6710∗∗∗ -3.8291∗∗∗ -3.6356∗∗∗ -3.7504∗∗∗
(0.4939) (0.4943) (0.4929) (0.4931)
Nationality -2.2095 -2.9454 -1.1620 -1.6565
(4.0662) (3.9554) (4.1492) (4.1060)
Gender -5.3873 -3.8582 -6.2832 -5.1519
(3.7405) (3.6529) (3.8259) (3.7997)
Education -9.7306∗∗ -9.5366∗∗ -5.8839 -5.3744
(3.9683) (3.8543) (3.9543) (3.9125)
Age 0.7075 0.8661 0.3622 0.4506
(0.5688) (0.5538) (0.5759) (0.5701)
Information 1.1111 -1.7060 0.5990 -1.7767
(4.6328) (4.5588) (4.7344) (4.7412)
Photo 2.5248 -0.4309 0.1228 -2.7120
(4.8515) (4.7646) (4.8196) (4.8447)
Location 7.0911 6.7754 6.2924 6.0198
(4.4577) (4.3317) (4.5511) (4.5018)
Constant -21.7443 -16.9087 -4.4035 1.9594
(17.1913) (16.7394) (16.6284) (16.5723)
Log likelihood -4186.5575 -4178.3598 -4196.7995 -4191.4658
Wald χ2 579.5878∗∗∗ 602.6511∗∗∗ 523.1235∗∗∗ 529.5387∗∗∗
N 1296 1296 1296 1296
N uncensored 727 727 1296 727
N lower uncensored 261 261 261 261
N upper uncensored 308 308 308 308
Nb groups 144 144 144 144
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Tobit regression results for contributions in first round
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the estimated coefficients for LCONTRIBUTE, DIFF and POSDIFF are
economically important and statistically significant.
The estimates presented in Table 3 are obtained from the full sample,
pooling data from all three experimental conditions. They demonstrate the
importance of allowing for dynamics, and for asymmetric responses to co-
players’ behavior. As for treatment effects, the only way in which treatment
is allowed to influence contributions is through inclusion of two treatment
dummies. This would imply an intercept effect, essentially shifting contribu-
tions up or down. However, we might expect treatment to affect the coeffi-
cients: for example, treatment could influence the way participants respond
to their co-players’ behavior. In this case, the estimates in Table 3 would be
subject to a specification error. To investigate this possibility and shed light
on how treatment affects behavior, we go on to estimate our model separately
for each experimental condition.
5.2 Treatment effects
We begin with our preferred specification, the dynamic tobit using Wooldridge’s
method. Table 4 presents the results from the symmetric and asymmetric
model, for each experimental condition.
The estimates for each treatment do differ in several important respects.
First, when we estimate the symmetric model we find that the responsiveness
to the average contribution by co-players, measured by the coefficient of the
variable DIFF , is very similar for the control and information treatment, but
much lower for the photo treatment. Second, the asymmetric model reveals
important differences between the photo treatment and the other two exper-
imental conditions. In the control and information conditions, the estimated
coefficients for DIFF and POSDIFF are both significant, and similar in
magnitude.22 Thus participants in these conditions would increase their con-
tributions after observing that their co-players had contributed more, and
decrease them, proportionately more, after observing that the other members
of their group had contributed less, on average. For the photo treatment,
however, only the estimated coefficient for POSDIFF is significant: in this
condition, participants do not appear to increase their contributions signif-
icantly in response to higher contributions by co-players; they only reduce
them after observing that the average for the other members of the group
was lower. This difference in dynamic behavior points to a second channel
22The coefficients for DIFF are significant at the 5% (control) and 1% (information)
levels; for POSDIFF they are significant at the 10% (control) and 5% (information)
levels.
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through which the photo treatment reduces overall contributions, in addition
to the effect on initial contributions examined in section 3.
The results summarised in Table 4 suggest that treatment effects in our
experiment cannot be adequately captured by including treatment dummies
in specifications with pooled data. We test this formally, and indeed find
that the restricted model (pooled data estimations) is rejected relative to the
unrestricted model (separate estimations for the three experimental condi-
tions).
For comparison, we again obtain estimates for each experimental condi-
tion using the random effects tobit specification: these are presented in Table
5. Comparing this with the previous table shows important differences in the
estimated POSDIFF coefficients: these underscore the value of correcting
for potential bias by using the Wooldridge method. Nevertheless, although
subject to bias, the estimates in Table 5 confirm that participants in the photo
treatment are less responsive to their co-players’ behavior overall, and that
this lower responsiveness is associated with a substantially lower willingness
to increase their contributions.
The analysis in this section sheds some additional light on the reasons
for lower average contributions in the photo treatment: when their personal
identity is salient and observable by future players, subjects appear to react
differently to the behavior of other players in their group. In particular,
they are less responsive overall, and substantially more reluctant to raise
their contributions after observing higher average contributions by their co-
players.
5.3 Discussion
At this point it is worth reviewing our main results so far, and possible
explanations. We have found that behavior in the photo treatment differs
significantly from the other two conditions. In particular, the photo treat-
ment is associated with:
(i) lower initial contributions;
(ii) lower responsiveness to co-players;
(iii) responsiveness more focused on reducing contributions, when higher
than co-players’ average.
How can we account for these differences? The results do not appear to
stem from the desire to set an example for future undergraduates to follow: if
this played an important role, we would also observe a significant difference
between the control group and the information treatment, which is not the
case. In this sense, we find no evidence of a role model effect.
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Another possible explanation might be that subjects, when told we would
let future undergraduates benefit from their ‘knowledge’ and ‘experience’,
were influenced to act in line with received teaching, and in particular the
Nash equilibrium prediction of zero contributions in the standard finitely
repeated voluntary contribution game (ignoring the possibility of strategic
reputation building). We saw in section 3 that subjects in the photo treat-
ment were not more likely to play the zero-contribution strategy, or some-
thing close to it, than subjects in the other experimental conditions. Could
it be that the experimental instructions’ mention of knowledge and experi-
ence nevertheless primed subjects to associate “being smart/rational” with
“playing selfishly”, and hence induced them to contribute less?23
If this had been the case, we should have observed lower contributions in
both the information and the photo treatment, whose instructions contained
exactly the same wording concerning knowledge and experience, relative to
the control group, whose instructions did not include that part. We found
instead that the photo treatment had significantly lower contributions than
both other conditions, while there was no significant difference between the
control group and the information treatment.
Two other possible explanations suggest themselves. First, subjects in the
photo treatment cared about how they would be perceived by future first-
year undergraduates, and this led them to contribute less. We will return
to this possible explanation in section 7. Second, participants in the photo
treatment paid more attention to the game, and as a consequence made fewer
contributions due to mistakes and confusion about how the game should be
played. If this were the correct explanation, we would expect the difference
between the photo treatment and the other two conditions to diminish in
the restart game, as subjects learn from their experience of playing the first
game. We examine the evidence from the restart game in the next section.
6 The restart game
In this section we present the results for the second round, which was a
surprise restart game: participants did not know until the first round had
ended that a second round would follow. The addition of the restart game,
following Andreoni [1988], is intended to test for learning effects. As in An-
dreoni [1988] and Croson [1996], we find that average contributions increase
23The idea that the teaching of Economics modifies students’ behavior towards greater
selfishness has been investigated in a number of empirical papers (see, among others,
Bauman and Rose [2011], Frank et al. [1993], Frey and Meier [2003], Marwell and Ames
[1981]).
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markedly between the last period of the first round and the first period of
the second round, in all three experimental conditions: this can be seen by
comparing Figure 4 with Figure 1.
Figure 4: Average contribution across periods in second round
Nevertheless, average contributions in the photo treatment continue to be
lower than in the other two conditions, throughout the second round. Looking
at distributions of contributions over the 10 periods in Figure 5 shows that,
even though the proportion of very low contributions is now higher for the
photo treatment than for the other groups, the lower average in the photo
treatment is due primarily to a much lower proportion of large contributions,
in favor of more moderate ones, as in the first round. We also repeated the
analysis applied earlier to the data for the first round: in particular, Table
6 reports the estimates for our preferred specification, the dynamic tobit
using Wooldridge’s method. The symmetric model gives qualitatively similar
results to those for the first round: once again, participants’ responsiveness
29
to their co-players’ average contributions is lower in the photo treatment.
For the asymmetric model, we find that in all three experimental conditions,
the coefficient for DIFF is insignificant while the one for POSDIFF is
highly significant. Thus participants’ (positive) responsiveness when their
co-players contribute more is no longer significant, even in the control and
the information conditions. However, participants in the photo treatment
are more responsive (negatively) than in the other conditions when their co-
players contribute less. Thus while there appear to be some learning effects,
they do not eliminate the significant difference between the photo treatment
and the other experimental conditions.
Figure 5: Distribution of contributions across conditions in second round
(observations are pooled over all ten periods)
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7 Conclusions
We have investigated experimentally how behavior in a ten-period repeated
public good game is affected when subjects know that their decisions and
outcomes will be observed by a future audience made up of younger stu-
dents enrolled at the same university. We did not find a significant effect
when the information transmitted did not permit identification of individ-
ual participants. However, in the photo treatment, where subjects knew that
they would be identified personally by future first-year undergraduate partic-
ipants, contributions were significantly lower. The photo treatment reduced
contributions in the first period of the game, and this effect was not explained
by differences in initial beliefs. The photo treatment also affected subsequent
dynamic behavior, notably by making subjects less willing to increase their
contributions after observing a higher average level of contributions by their
co-players, and more willing to reduce their contributions in response to a
lower average level of contribution by co-players. The effect on dynamic
behavior amplified the effect of treatment on initial choices.
The fact that this surprising result only applies to the photo treatment,
while contributions in the information treatment do not differ significantly
from the control group, suggests that we can rule out some possible expla-
nations. First, the results are not driven simply by subjects’ desire to set an
example for future undergraduate participants to follow (i.e., the role model
idea), as this should apply to the information treatment too. Similarly, the
results are not explained by a possible effect of the experimental instructions’
reference to knowledge and experience, since this reference was identical for
the information and photo treatments. Third, visibility by the experimenters
was held constant for all three experimental conditions and cannot account
for the differences between them.
One possible explanation could be that the photo treatment induces sub-
jects to pay more attention and think more carefully about their strategy,
because their personal reputation is at stake. This would reduce large con-
tributions due to mistakes and limited attention. While such an effect seems
plausible and intuitive, it appears less convincing as an explanation for the
persistent difference between the photo treatment and the other two condi-
tions in the surprise restart game. The evidence from this game suggests
that subjects are paying attention and thinking carefully about their strat-
egy in all three conditions, as evidenced by the changes in dynamic behavior
relative to the first game. In particular, subjects in the control group and
the information treatment are now significantly less willing to raise their con-
tributions after observing higher average contributions by their co-players.
However, this does not close the gap between treatments, because subjects
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in the photo treatment are also learning, and reducing their contributions
proportionately more after observing a lower average level of contributions
by co-players (more relative to the first game, and also relative to the other
two experimental conditions). Thus differences in attention and mistakes do
not appear to fully explain the data.
Our results seem best explained by participants caring about how they
will be perceived by first-year undergraduates arriving the following year,
in line with the literature on image concerns. The novelty here is that this
reduces contributions.
This could be because the graduate students in our photo treatment ex-
pected future first-year undergraduates to evaluate them based on the “homo
economicus” paradigm, equating being smart/rational with zero contribu-
tions. However, if subjects in the photo treatment had wanted future first-
year undergraduates to perceive them as adhering to the homo economicus
paradigm, they should have chosen more frequently the Nash equilibrium
strategy of contributing zero (or something very close to it). Instead, the dif-
ference in average contributions between the photo treatment and the other
two conditions is mostly accounted for by a substantially lower proportion of
very large contributions, in favor of moderate, but not very small, amounts,
which do not have a clear signaling value in terms of homo economicus.
This suggests an alternative explanation: subjects in the photo treatment
care about not being perceived as “suckers” by future participants. This has
a dampening effect on their contributions. Moreover, it makes them less
willing to increase their contributions when they have contributed less than
the average of the rest of the group (which could reverse their ranking), and
more willing to reduce their contribution when they have been contributing
above the others’ average.
The notion that people do not like the “highly aversive” feeling of being
a sucker, and that their behavior will be motivated in a variety of ways to
avoid it, has received considerable attention in the psychology literature [Vohs
et al., 2007].24 Our experimental results suggest something more: individuals’
willingness to cooperate and engage in prosocial behavior may be inhibited
by the fear of being perceived as suckers by others, even when they would
not themselves feel like suckers privately.
This could potentially apply to a broad array of cooperative and prosocial
behaviors, implying that the impact and value of visibility are highly context-
dependent. Further investigation of these effects, in the field as well as the
24In this literature, to be a sucker requires that “one has given more than one has gotten
or... one has gained less than one thinks one deserves” [Vohs et al., 2007, p.128]. See also
Wilkinson-Ryan [2008], who argues that there is a social norm against being a sucker,
which may be a factor in discouraging victims from reporting certain crimes (e.g. fraud).
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lab, seems a promising avenue for future research.
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Appendix A Experimental Instructions
Welcome to the Laboratory of Experimental Economics of Bocconi Univer-
sity, Milan [Toulouse School of Economics].
This is an experiment in group and individual decision making.
All decisions you make in this experiment are anonymous. Please do not
talk with one another during the experiment. If you have any questions,
please raise your hand.
In this experiment you will participate in 10 periods of a voluntary con-
tribution game.
At the beginning of period 1, everyone is randomly assigned to a group
of 4 individuals.
You will continue to be part of the same group for all the 10 periods.
The 3 other members of your group will never know your identity nor
will you know their identity. You only know that all participants at this
experiment are graduate students at your university.
Rules of the game you will play in each period
At the beginning of each period each group member will get 100 ‘euro-
cents’ (e 1) in his/her private account.
In every period each of you must decide how many of your cents you want
to contribute to the group account. Euro-cents not contributed to the group
account remain in your private account.
The number of cents in the group account equals the sum of cents con-
tributed by you and the other 3 group members in that period.
Example: If you contribute 20 and the other members of the group con-
tribute respectively 40, 0 and 80, the amount in the group account will be
20 + 40 + 0 + 80 = 140.
Your earnings from each period will be the sum of the eurocents you leave
in your private account and of your share of the group account.
Earnings from the group account depend on the total number of euro-
cents (TC) in that account. Each euro-cent in the group account will be
doubled and then shared equally among the 4 subjects in the group. In other
words, each individual in a group will receive half of the amount of the group
account (TC/2).
Let us clarify all of the above through some examples.
Information at the end of each period
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Example 1 
 
Contributions 
to the group account 
  
Earnings from the group 
account = TC/2 
  
Total earnings  
in the Round 
  
You Other Other Other TC  You Other Other Other  You Other Other Other 
100 100 100 100 400  200 200 200 200  200 200 200 200 
 
Example 2 
 
Contributions 
to the group account 
  
Earnings from the group 
account = TC/2 
  
Total earnings  
in the Round 
  
You Other Other Other TC  You Other Other Other  You Other Other Other 
0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0        100 100 100 100 
 
Example 3 
 
Contributions 
to the group account 
  
Earnings from the group 
account = TC/2 
  
Total earnings  
in the Round 
  
You Other Other Other TC  You Other Other Other  You Other Other Other 
45 0 75 0 120  60 60 60 60  115 160 85 160 
 
Example 4 
 
Contributions 
to the group account 
  
Earnings from the group 
account = TC/2 
  
Total earnings  
in the Round 
  
You Other Other Other TC  You Other Other Other  You Other Other Other 
0 80 0 20 100  50 50 50 50  150 70 150 130 
 
At the end of each period, each member of the group will see at the
bottom of the screen:
- the contribution of the 4 members of the group, ranked from the highest
to the lowest (notice that it is not possible to link a specific contribution to
a specific individual);
- the total amount of the group account;
- his/her earnings from the group account (TC/2);
- the amount he/she decided to leave in his/her private account;
- his/her total earnings in that period;
- the sum of his/her total earnings in all the previous periods.
Guesses
In period 1, before taking your decision about the contribution, we ask
you to guess the average contribution of your 3 co-players. This will be a
number between 0 and 100 euro-cents.
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- If the difference between your guess and your co-players’s average con-
tribution is less than or equal to 10 euro-cents, you will receive 500 euro-cents
(e 5) at the end of the experiment.
- If the difference between your guess and your co-player’s average con-
tribution is greater than 10 euro-cents, you will receive nothing.
Important: the correctness of your guess in period 1 does not depend on
your contribution in period 1.
Example 1: Suppose that the other members of the group contribute
respectively 12, 0 and 56. Therefore, their average contribution is (12 + 0
+ 56) : 3 = 22.7, i.e. 23. You win 500 euro-cents if your guess is a number
between 13 and 33 (13 and 33 included).
Example 2: Suppose that the other members of the group contribute
respectively 69, 82 and 93. Therefore, their average contribution is (69 + 82
+ 93) : 3 = 81.3, i.e. 81. you win 500 euro-cents if your guess is a number
between 71 and 91 (71 and 91 included).
Total Earnings
Your earnings from the experiment will be the sum of the total earnings
from all 10 periods plus e 5 in case your guess of your co-players’ average
contribution in period 1 is right.
Remember that the sum of your earnings in the voluntary contribution
game is recorded and displayed at the end of each period at the bottom of
your screen. Your earnings for the correctness of the guess will be added at
the end of the experiment, when we will pay you everything in cash.
Are there any questions?
[The following part only concerns treatments “information” and “photo”]
Important
At the beginning of the next academic year, we will run other sessions
of this experiment, this time with first-year undergraduate students of this
university as participants.
Undergraduate students are supposed to be younger than you and less
experienced in playing such a game. Moreover, being graduate students, you
are supposed to have studied and analyzed this game many more times than
the undergraduates.
We will let each undergraduate student enrolling in one of the sessions
we will run in the new year benefit from your ‘knowledge’ and ‘experience’.
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More precisely, in one year from now we will transmit your behavior in the
game to the undergraduate student that (by chance) will be seated, during
the session in which he/she will take part, in the same place where you are
now, playing the same game you are playing, using the same computer you
are using. In particular, he/she will play the game with other first-year
undergraduates, under the same group matching as yours. This means that
the same three computers that will be randomly matched to yours so as to
form a group during this session will be matched to the computer of the
undergraduate student to whom we will transmit your behavior in the game.
Each undergraduate student participating in the session, before starting
the experiment, will know:
- all the ‘history’ (contributions in each period and earnings in each
period) of the graduate student sitting in the same place as himself/herself;
- the ‘ranking’ of the graduate student sitting in the same place as
himself/herself in terms of contributions and earnings, relative to the other
3 graduate students in his/her group.
In other words, we will print and transmit to the undergraduate student
sitting in the same place as you the history table that you will see at the
bottom of your screen at the end of each period.
Notice that:
- the undergraduate student sitting in the same place as you will know
your gender, age, academic level, and nationality, but not your other
personal data (name, surname, email address, phone, etc.);
- [only in treatment “photo”] he/she will also see, during all the session
he/she will attend, your picture, in the same screen in which we will put
your data (contributions and earnings in the experiment, ranking inside your
group, gender, age, academic level, and nationality);
- there is no payment (neither for you, nor for the undergraduate student)
for this transmission; in particular, your earnings and the undergraduate
student’s earnings will be independent.
Is everything clear? Are there any questions before we begin?
[The following part is distributed, in all treatments, only at the end of the
first round of the experiment.]
Second Round of the Experiment
Surprise: the experiment has not ended! We offer you the opportunity to
play a second round with 10 periods of the game, under the same rules as
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the first round of the game, and with the same type of information provided
at the end of each period (total amount of the group account, your earnings
from the group account, etc.).
More importantly, you would play the other 10 periods of the game with
the same 3 co-players with whom you just played the first 10 periods (same
group as in the first round).
Participation in this second round of the game is not compulsory: if you
wish, you can give up the experiment and be paid only your earnings in the
first round.
However, if you choose to continue the experiment, you will be paid also
for the second round. In this case, as for the first round, your earnings will
be the sum of the total earnings from all 10 periods plus e5 in case your
guess of your co-players’ average contribution in the new period 1 is right.
In view of the above, do you want to give up or continue the experiment?
[The following part only concerns treatments “information” and “photo”]
Important
Undergraduates in the sessions that we will run at the beginning of the
next academic year will observe, at this point of the experiment, the same
“surprise”: they will be given the possibility to play a second round with 10
periods of the game, under the same rules, type of information and with the
same co-players as in the first round.
They will also be told that, before playing the second round, they will be
shown your ‘history’ and ‘ranking’. In other words, as we did for the first
round, and only after its end, we will transmit to the undergraduate student
sitting in the same place as you the history table that you will see at the
bottom of your screen at the end of each period of the second round.
As for the first round, there is no payment (neither for you, nor for the
undergraduate student) for this transmission; in particular, your earnings and
the undergraduate student’s earnings in the second round of the experiment
will be independent.
Is everything clear? Are there any questions before we begin the second
round?
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Appendix B Screenshot
Figure 6: Feedback after 10 periods
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